Chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) as applied to the CPI was first fully described in the first edition of this CCPS Guidelines book. This second edition is packed with information reflecting advances in this evolving methodology, and includes worked examples on a CD-ROM. CPQRA is used to identify incident scenarios and evaluate their risk by defining the probability of failure, the various consequences and the potential impact of those consequences. It is an invaluable methodology to evaluate these when qualitative analysis cannot provide adequate understanding and when more information is needed for risk management. This technique provides a means to evaluate acute hazards and alternative risk reduction strategies, and identify areas for cost-effective risk reduction. There are no simple answers when complex issues are concerned, but CPQRA2 offers a cogent, well-illustrated guide to applying these risk-analysis techniques, particularly to risk control studies.
Abstract:The high hazard mechanical system (HHMS) has three characteristics in the petroleum and petrochemical industry (PPI): high risk, high cost, and high technology requirements. For a HHMS, part, component, and subsystem failures will result in varying degrees and various types of risk consequences, including unexpected downtime, production losses, economic costs, safety accidents, and environmental pollution. Thus, obtaining the quantitative risk level and distribution in a HHMS to control major risk accidents and ensure safe production is of vital importance. However, the structure of the HHMS is more complex than some other systems, making the quantitative risk analysis process more difficult. Additionally, a variety of uncertain risk data hinder the realization of quantitative risk analysis. A few quantitative risk analysis techniques and studies for HHMS exist, especially in the PPI. Therefore, a study on the quantitative risk analysis method for HHMS was completed to obtain the risk level and distribution of high-risk objects. Firstly, Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) was applied to address the uncertain risk data for the occurrence probability (OP) and consequence severity (CS) in the risk analysis process. Secondly, a fuzzy fault tree analysis (FFTA) and a fuzzy event tree analysis (FETA) were used to achieve quantitative risk analysis and calculation. Thirdly, a fuzzy bow-tie model (FBTM) was established to obtain a quantitative risk assessment result according to the analysis results of the FFTA and FETA. Finally, the feasibility and practicability of the method were verified with a case study on the quantitative risk analysis of one reciprocating pump system (RPS). The quantitative risk analysis method for HHMS can provide more accurate and scientific data support for the development of Asset Integrity Management (AIM) systems in the PPI.Keywords: quantitative risk analysis; high hazard mechanical system; fuzzy fault tree analysis; fuzzy event tree analysis; fuzzy bow-tie model; Fuzzy Set Theory
Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis download
From time in all industrialised countries attention is focused on the risks due to major accidents in storage, production and transportation of dangerous chemicals. In Italy too, and specifically at the University of Bologna, relevant work has been performed in the field of risk analysis. The chief aim of the researches done in the past years has been the development of detailed techniques for the calculation of specific risk measures, implemented in user-friendly software codes. In this paper the main features of these tools will be presented, particularly highlighting the application field of each of them and the support they can give to decision-makers in risk management.
I just finished to summarized Seven Steps of CPQRA extracted from the guidelines. Hopefully this summary is useful for you to learn the basics of quantitative risk assessment in chemical process industries.
Although spill incidents at loading and unloading facilities account for only 4% of the chemical accidents that occurred in Korea during the last four years, the increase is incremental each year. Loading and unloading facilities are equipped with trenches in preparation for mass drainage because transports by vehicle are frequent and physical blocking is difficult when a release accident occurs. Particularly, in the case of a chemical release with a high vapor pressure, the trench is effective to mitigate accidents by reducing the liquid surface to primarily prevent dispersion. This study proposes an improved trench system that can effectively and rapidly withdraw large amounts of chemicals spilled from transport vehicles. Assuming a total volume leakage of a 55% hydrofluoric acid (HFA) solution from a transport vehicle, the study confirmed the risk-reducing effect by comparing using the consequence analysis program (ALOHA) and Probit analysis. The results show that minimizing the time that the released chemicals stay in the trench using control system (pH meter and automatic valve) can reduce the amount of chemicals vaporizing, thereby minimizing the effect distance of the release incident.
Hazard assessments are simply a process of identifying hazards, evaluating the risks presented by those hazards, and managing the risks of the hazards of the experiment to be performed by incorporating appropriate hazard controls into the experimental design process. There are many types of hazard assessment tools, from the very basic qualitative to more complex quantitative reviews.
Creating a Shared Vision Model. What is a Shared Vision Model? 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