I wish to make two points with this example. First, the elaboration of an alternative approach has improved science in epistemic respect. It has contributed to uncovering unsupported assumptions that had escaped notice before; it has prompted new questions and suggested new lines of inquiry. The advancement of the feminist alternative has provided a deeper and more complete understanding of the archeological evidence. Second, this epistemic benefit was not gained by dropping a one-sided approach and replacing it with a more neutral one. Rather, the alternative feminist approach involves a social model or political values as well. This time it is the role model of the working couple and of gender equality that guides theory development. We can make epistemic progress while continuing to bring value-commitments to bear.
Accordingly, this behavior would violate the commitment to sincerity or honesty (that David Resnik includes in his principles of the ethics of science (Resnik 1998, p. 53)) and involve a misrepresentation of the issues addressed. Such methodological flaws or fraudulence can be corrected by pluralism. A study of the kind analyzed needs to be supplemented with another one addressing the issue of false negatives. In fact, given that there is no general rule for striking a methodologically justified balance between the opposite inductive risks, pluralism is the only means for moving toward an appropriate equilibrium.
Curd And Cover Philosophy Of Science The Central Issues Pdf 33
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Third, what I take to be broadly shared in scientific communities is their epistemic attitude, that is, their commitment to the gain of objective knowledge. The relevant common ground cannot consist in common standards for judging assumptions. The only such uncontested standards are empirical adequacy and consistency, and they are insufficient for producing consensus (as the underdetermination argument shows, see Sect. 3). Further, appeal to epistemic values of the sort introduced (broad scope, accuracy, coherence, and the like) cannot be responsible for creating unanimity because these values are not shared to a sufficient degree. Criteria of assessment are too diverse and too variable within the scientific community. There are contrasting commitments brought to bear within a scientific community, and there are significant changes across historical epochs. This is why I attribute consensus formation to a different level of values. I contend that the epistemic attitude is codified in the form of procedural rules of the scientific community. The epistemic attitude does not address the process of assessing hypotheses directly; it rather concerns procedures for debating such assessments. This attitude finds its expression, in particular, in commitments like attending to dissenting views and empirical problems, taking up criticism, and granting intellectual authority on substantive grounds alone. Further, these rules are essentially social: they address how to deal with nonconformist understandings and opposing approaches. Such procedural rules for addressing substantive diversity are suitable for constraining antagonistic beliefs and to drive them toward a common position.Footnote 9 This general approach is certainly not unheard of. Dissent in political or legal issues is likewise sometimes resolved by appeal to procedural rules. The claim I advance here is that the same distinction between substantive and evaluative dissent, on the one hand, and procedural agreement works in science as well. Further, these procedural values are social in that they are community rules, but they are also epistemic in that following their advice is conducive to reliability or truth, that is, epistemic goals of science.
Such is the case in the study of industry-funded science as seen from the vantage points of philosophy of science and from science policy studies. While both disciplines have an extensive literature on the influence of industry-funding on science, they have remained, so far as I can discern, almost completely distinct. To wit, review articles of academic-industry relations summarizing research in science policy (Perkmann et al., 2021) and philosophy of science (Holman and Elliott, 2018) do not share a single common source despite both including over 100 citations. Of course, some of the sources in the former were published after 2018 and could not have been cited in the latter, but this does not explain the absence of the research cited in the philosophy of science review from informing the science policy literature. In short, there really are two largely independent bodies of research.
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an indispensable reference source and guide to the major themes, debates, problems and topics in philosophy of science. It contains sixty-two specially commissioned entries by a leading team of international contributors. Organized into four parts it covers:
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science addresses all of the essential topics that students of philosophy of science need to know - from empiricism, explanation and experiment to causation, observation, prediction and more - and contains many helpful features including chapters on individual sciences (such as biology, chemistry, physics and psychology), further reading and cross-referencing at the end of each chapter.
Introduction Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos Part 1: Historical and Philosophical Context 1. Conventionalism Robert DiSalle 2. The Epistemology of Science after Quine Paul A. Roth 3. The History of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science Joanne Waugh and Roger Ariew 4. Metaphysics Stephen Mumford 5. Philosophy of Language Rod Bertolet 6. The Role of Logic in Philosophy of Science Diderik Batens 7. Critical Rationalism Gürol Irzik 8. The Historical Turn in the Philosophy of Science Alexander Bird 9. Logical Empiricism Thomas Uebel 10. Pragmatism and Science Robert Almeder 11. Social Epistemology K. Brad Wray Part 2: Debates 12. Bayesianism Colin Howson 13. Computer Simulation Wendy S. Parker 14. Confirmation Alan Hájek and James M. Joyce 15. Empiricism Elliott Sober 16. Essentialism and Natural Kinds Brian Ellis 17. Ethics of Science David B. Resnik 18. Experiment Theodore Arabatzis 19. Explanation Jim Woodward 20. Feminist Approach to the Philosophy of Science Cassandra L. Pinnick 20. Inference to the Best Explanation Peter Lipton 22. Laws of Nature Marc Lange 23. Naturalism Ronald N. Giere 24. Realism/Anti-Realism Michael Devitt 25. Relativism about Science Maria Baghramian 26. Scientific Method Howard Sankey 27. Social Studies of Science Robert Nola 28. The Structure of Theories Steven French 29. Theory-Change John Worrall 30. Thought Experiments James Robert Brown 31. Underdetermination Igor Douven 32. Values in Science Gerald Doppelt Part 3: Concepts 33. Causation Christopher Hitchcock 34. Determinism Barry Loewer 35. Evidence Peter Achinstein 36. Function Denis Walsh 37. Idealization James Ladyman 38. Measurement Hasok Chang and Nancy Cartwright 39. Mechanisms Stuart Glennan 40. Models Demetris Portides 41. Observation André Kukla 42. Prediction Malcolm Forster 43. Probability Maria-Carla Galavotti 44. Pseudoscience Bradley Monton 45. Reduction Sahotra Sarkar 46. Representation in Science Paul Teller 47. Scientific Discovery Thomas Nickles 48. Space and Time Oliver Pooley 49. Species and Taxonomy Marc Ereshefsky 50. Symmetry Margaret Morrison 51. Truthlikeness Graham Oddie 52. Unification Todd Jones 53. The Virtues of a Good Theory Ernan McMullin Part 4: The Individual Sciences 54. Biology Alexander Rosenberg 55. Chemistry Robin Findlay Hendry 56. Cognitive Science Paul Thagard 57. Cosmology Chris Smeenk 58. Economics Uskali Maki 59. Mathematics Peter Clark 60. Physics Simon Saunders 61. Psychology Richard Samuels 62. Social Sciences Harold Kincaid. Index
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"Here is philosophy of science the way it should be. In these pages some of the very best philosophers working today grapple with the big issues of metaphysics, language, and epistemology as they relate to science. This volume is a true introduction to a philosophy of science that has real stature; a philosophy of science that puts the subject at the crossing point of arguments from across the intellectual landscape." - Peter Galison, Harvard University, USA
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The difficulties in identifying and conceptualizing scientificrevolutions involve many of the most challenging issues inepistemology, methodology, ontology, philosophy of language, and evenvalue theory. With revolution we immediately confront the problem ofdeep, possibly noncumulative, conceptual and practical change, now inmodern science itself, a locus that Enlightenment thinkers would havefound surprising. And since revolution is typically driven by newresults, or by a conceptual-cum-social reorganization of old ones,often highly unexpected, we also confront the hard problem ofunderstanding creative innovation. Third, major revolutions supposedlychange the normative landscape of research by altering the goals andmethodological standards of the enterprise, so we face also thedifficult problem of relating descriptive claims to normative claimsand practices, and changes in the former to changes in the latter. 2ff7e9595c
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